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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses panel data from 271 U.S. firms to empirically examine the relationship between 
the departure of a firm’s CEO and that firm’s performance. Results of our analysis reveal a 
significant relationship between CEO departure and firm performance. Specifically, we found that 
the departure of entrenched CEOs negatively affects current and future firm performance. Results 
also demonstrate that board size and the presence of independent administrators moderates the 
relationship between CEO departure and firm performance. This suggests that entrenched CEOs 
can have informal associations with independent administrators. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance has been 
examined extensively in the empirical literature (see Puffer and Weintrop, 1991; Parrino, 1997). 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest that when the likelihood of CEO turnover is high and firm 
performance is poor, the threat of being fired can incentivize the CEO. Related to this, Coles et al. (2011) show that 
the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is widely considered as a mechanism for aligning managerial 
and shareholder interests. Denis and Denis (1995) further explored the causes and effects of CEO turnover, 
demonstrating that relative to traditional retirement, forced CEO turnovers typically result from poor firm 
performance, but are often followed by substantial improvement in firm performance. Engel et al. (2003) 
substantiated the findings of Denis and Denis (1995), showing that CEO turnover usually follows poor firm 
performance; this relationship was also moderated by the nature of the CEO’s departure (voluntary or forced). 
Finally, Coates and Kraakman (2010) document that CEO turnover is significantly related to firm performance 
during the CEO’s first four years in office. Taken together, these studies suggest that whereas forced CEO turnover 
(i.e., firings) tend to be related to poor firm performance, voluntary CEO departures (i.e., retirements) are not. 
Further, these results demonstrate that relative to retirement, forced CEO departures are associated with more 
pronounced post-departure improvements in firm performance.  
 
Jensen (1993) suggests that the board of directors is weak with regard to disciplining managers of firms that 
perform poorly, particularly when the CEO is chairman of the board. Jensen (1993) instead argues that independent 
directors are much more effective for disciplining CEOs. Denis et al. (1997) show how board composition affects 
the relationship between firm performance and forced executive turnover. Despite their general weakness with 
respect to disciplining managers, boards of directors may incite executive turnover when the CEO’s managerial 
power is low. To this end, boards of directors often use firm-level performance measures to evaluate CEOs’ efforts. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) reveal an inverse relationship between the regularity of board meetings and CEO 
tenure, suggesting that boards are more critical of newer CEOs, but ease their criticism as time passes. Godard and 
Chatt (2004) assert that the absence of independent directors is a primary source of board ineffectiveness. Moreover, 
the accumulation of management decisions made by the CEO reduces board independence and its power to 
effectively monitor that CEO (Goyal and Park, 2002).  
 
T 
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Results of empirical work evaluating the relationship between the proportion of outside directors on a board 
(which has served as a proxy for board independence) and firm performance have been mixed. Bhagat and Black 
(1999) demonstrate no linkage between the proportion of independent directors on a firm’s board and Tobin’s Q.1 In 
contrast, MacAvoy and Millstein (1999) show that the disclosure of a board member as an independent director is 
positively associated with stock-exchange returns. Limiting the size of the board of directors is similarly believed to 
affect firm performance. Furest and Kang (2000), for example, demonstrate that board size is negatively related with 
firm performance. 
  
Although past research in this domain has done much to illustrate the nature of the relationships between 
CEO turnover, board composition, and firm performance, our approach differs from this work in a number of ways. 
While previous research has shown how firm performance affects forced CEO turnover, our primary objective is to 
explore the opposite—how the nature of a CEO’s departure influences firm performance. To accomplish this goal, 
we consider two scenarios: CEO departure versus no departure. Our second objective is to assess the moderating 
effect of a number of variables related to firm governance (i.e., board size, proportion of outsiders, duality, CEO 
tenure, CEO ownership) on the association between CEO departure and firm performance. We utilize three 
accounting measures as a proxy for firm performance: discretionary earnings, current performance, and future 
performance. Consistent with Defond and Park (1997), we define future performance with real data rather than 
forecast data. Specifically, we pursue our research objectives through the evaluation of data gleaned from a panel of 
271 large, publicly traded American firms between 1994 and 2006.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized in a series of interrelated sections. Section 2 provides a review of 
salient literature and proposes our research hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe the research design and data, and 
report descriptive statistics associated with our sample. We discuss the empirical results of our multivariate analyses 
in Section 4, and offer some concluding remarks in Section 5.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
Performance And Turnover  
 
Several studies have shown that the CEO turnover is closely linked to firms’ financial performance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest that the evolution of stock-exchange prices reflects the continuation (or 
conclusion) of a CEO’s tenure. Many empirical studies on American firms show that poor firm performance 
precedes CEO turnover (e.g., Adams et al., 2012; Warner et al., 1988). Similarly, Jensen and Murphy (1990) provide 
evidence that the likelihood of CEO turnover is largely contingent on a firm’s relative performance. Coates and 
Kraakman (2010) also show that CEO turnover is significantly related to firm performance, particularly during the 
CEO’s first four years in office. Evans, Nagarajan, and Schloetzer (2010) reveal a positive relationship between 
prior firm performance and the likelihood of CEO retention on the board.  
 
In contrast to empirical work depicting a positive relationship between CEO turnover and firm 
performance, Berry et al. (2000) indicate that CEO turnover is not influenced by firm performance for a number of 
companies. Subramanian et al. (2002) note that CEOs with financial compensation contracts are more likely to be 
fired following poor performance. The authors further argue that this pressure may have increased during the 1990s. 
In their examination of 69 forced resignations, Denis and Denis (1995) show that financial markets react to the 
dismissal of underperforming CEOs with relief. Dherment and Renneboog (2000) similarly demonstrate that 
whereas voluntary resignations do not result in price reactions in the market, announcements of forced CEO 
resignations are perceived positively by the market in the form of small but significant positive abnormal returns. In 
another distinction, declining firm performance generally does not precede voluntary CEO retirement (Denis and 
Denis, 1995). However, Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) provide evidence for significant negative cumulative 
abnormal returns following forced turnover. This reaction is likely the result of market precaution; forced turnover 
may serve as an indicator of poor current and future performance that had not anticipated by the market. Etebari, 
Corrigan, and Land (1987) provide substantiating evidence for the negative relationship between forced CEO 
                                                
1 A majority of studies have examined the association between corporate governance and firm performance using Tobin's Q as a proxy for the 
firm performance. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2015 Volume 31, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 347 The Clute Institute 
turnover and cumulative abnormal returns, showing a CEO’s death (except due to an accident) to result in negative 
cumulative abnormal returns. Taken in concert, these findings suggest that CEOs may be entrenched in their 
respective positions, and thereby difficult to dismiss, even in response to poor performance. 
  
 To examine the influence of CEO departure on firm performance, we consider two scenarios as a 
categorical predictor variable: CEO departure versus no departure. We predict that a CEO’s departure from the firm 
will significantly affect that firm’s current and future performance. Given this, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  CEO departure influences the current and future performance of the firm. 
 
Turnover And Governance 
 
Husson et al. (2001) demonstrate that relative to the 1970s, the frequency with which CEOs were forced to 
leave their positions increased during the 1990s, leaving boards of directors more independent. Past research shows 
that the most important responsibility of boards of directors is to monitor and evaluate CEO performance. In this 
vein, boards of directors play an important role in selecting, transferring, fixing compensation for, and sometimes 
vetoing the CEO’s recommendations. Given their importance in relation to the CEO and the firm, boards of directors 
have received substantial empirical attention.  
 
Two conflicting positions characterize the literature with regard to the composition of a board of directors 
(Jensen, 1993). The first perspective, which we dub “outsider effectiveness,” argues that as a result of reputation 
capital, equity ownership, and less personal involvement with the CEO, independent directors are less likely to be 
influenced by firm CEOs. By motivating CEOs with lucrative compensation or risk of dismissal, independent 
administrators can more effectively exert control over firm managers. In line with this perspective, Denis et al. 
(1997) show a stronger relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance for firms with boards of directors 
dominated by outsiders. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) demonstrate that boards of directors meet less 
frequently as the length of a CEO’s tenure increases. This can be explained in terms of (a) the CEO’s entrenchment 
over time, or (b) the board’s improved perceptions of the CEO’s ability. Gedds and Vinod (1998) show that a higher 
proportion of outsiders reduces the survival of the CEO at the firm. In addition, Farrell et al. (2003) show an inverse 
relation between firm performance and the likelihood that an outsider is appointed CEO.  
 
We refer to the second perspective related to the composition of the board and firm performance as “CEO 
hegemony.” This view stipulates that when a CEO is capable of exerting significant influence over the board of 
directors, the number and the proportion of the external administrators on the board are related to the CEO’s tenure. 
Furthermore, Goyal and Park (2002) demonstrate how board structure moderates the relationship between CEO 
rotation and firm performance. The presence of the duality in a firm (chief executive officer also being the chairman 
of the board) reduces the CEO’s control of the board, thereby easing the dismissal of poorly performing CEOs. As a 
result, the likelihood of CEO turnover will be less sensitive to firm performance. Jensen (1993) comes to a similar 
conclusion. Similarly, Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006) demonstrate that the CEOs who possess more than one function 
are less likely to be replaced when their contracts end. 
 
Governance And Performance 
 
Jensen (1993) suggests that the inclusion of the external directors on boards of directors increases their 
viability and decreases the probability of collusion to expropriate shareholders’ wealth. In this way, external 
directors act in the best interests of shareholders by protecting the value of the company. For example, Frankel, 
McVay, and Soliman (2007) suggest that a board of directors’ independence is correlated to the quality of the 
financial information revealed in financial statements. Similarly, MacAvoy and Millstein (1999) show that firms 
with independent boards of directors are more successful in terms of return on stock-exchange securities. They 
further demonstrate that the appointment of an external director to the board is associated with an excess of positive 
stock-exchange returns.  
 
Hermalin and Weishback (1998) show that the probability of CEO turnover is more sensitive to negative 
firm performance when there are more independent directors on the board. Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) similarly 
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assert that in the absence of independent directors’ influence on the CEO, firm performance suffers. In contrast, 
Bhagat and Black (1999) find a negative correlation between Tobin’s Q and the proportion of independent directors 
on the board. They additionally show a relationship between a board’s proportion of independent directors and the 
value of the company. These results suggest that increasing the number of the independent administrators on the 
board without a proportional increase in their ownership of the company can negatively affect firm performance. 
The researchers did not find the same results concerning the influence of the duality on the performance of the firm. 
In this vein, Worsell, Nemec and Davidson (1997) demonstrate a negative influence of firm duality on performance. 
In contrast to these results, Baliga, Moyer, and Reo (1996) failed to find any effect of firm duality on performance.  
 
Many researchers have explored the relationship between the size of a board of directors and its functional 
efficiency (Jensen, 1993; Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998). Eisenberg and his colleagues (1998) also report a 
negative correlation between board size and firm earnings. In agreement with the work of Eisenberg, Furest et al. 
(2000) demonstrate that an increase in the size of a board negatively affects firm performance. Faleye (2007) also 
performed research related to board size and firm financial performance. He shows that abnormal returns on security 
exchanges decrease with the size of the board. Taken together, the results of empirical research related to board size 
and firm performance are largely mixed. Despite these inconsistent results, firms tend to prefer large boards of 
directors because they contain a greater number (and variety of) competencies relative to small boards. 
 
Given the above, we propose the following five hypotheses:  
 
H2a  The relationship between CEO departure and firm performance is accentuated by the size of the board of 
directors.  
H2b  The relationship between CEO departure and firm performance is accentuated by the percentage of 
independent influences within the board of directors.  
H3a  The relationship between CEO departure and firm performance is hampered by the duality of the CEO’s 
function. 
H3b  The relationship between CEO departure and firm performance is hampered by the CEO’s property 
(proportion of the company owned by the CEO). 
H3c  The relationship between CEO departure and firm performance is hampered by the length of a CEO’s 
tenure. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Model Of Interest And Variables 
 
 To test the hypotheses outlined above, we estimate the following regression model:  
 
Dep.Variableit =α0 +α1Typ.depit +α2Tenureit +α3Dualit +α4CEO.propit +α5Board.sizeit +α6Board.indepit
+α7Sizeit +α8Levit +εit  
(1) 
 
where the dependent variable can signify a lack of discretionary earnings (No.disc.earning), current performance 
(Current.Perf), or future performance (Future.Perf). Different models test our hypotheses by changing the outcome 
variable but leaving the predictor variables unchanged. 
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Table 1: Description Of Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable Symbol Measure 
No discretionary earning  
Model 1 
NE2-DA No.Disc.Earning 
Current performance  
Model 2 
CNDE3- CMNE4 Current.Perf 
Future performance  
Model 3 
FNDE5-FMNE6 Future.Perf 
 
In these models, DA represents the discretionary accruals estimated with the modified Jones (1995) model. 
DA is signified by the following linear regression: 
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where for sample firm i at time t. TAit  represents the total accruals; Ait−1  signifies the total assets at time t-1; REVit
is the total revenues; ARit  is account receivable at the end of the fiscal year; ΔREVit −ΔARit  represents changes in 
cash revenue; PPEit  stands for gross property, plants, and equipment at the end of the fiscal year; and itε  is the 
error term. 
 
The measures and symbols of independent variables used in the three models are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Description Of Independents Variables 
Variables Symbol Measure 
Departure Typ.dep A dummy variable (1 = CEO departure, 0 = no CEO departure). 
Tenure Tenure Number of years that a CEO has been in office as of the company’s end of the fiscal year. 
Duality Dual A dummy variable (1 = CEO and BoD functions combined, 0 = otherwise). 
Propriety of CEO  CEO.prop Percentage of property owned by CEO. 
Board size Board.size Number of members on the board. 
Board independence Board.indep Number of outside members on the board of directors. 
Firm size Size Logarithmic transformation of total assets. 
Leverage Lev Debts/Total Assets. 
 
Data 
 
Our sample consists of 271 companies that were listed on the Fortune Global 500 list between 1994 and 
2006. This provides a sample size of 2981 observations. As shown in Table 3, our sample is divided into 12 
industries based on relative industry performance. We require that at least 20 firms be included in each two-digit 
SIC industry (see Defond and Park, 1997). We extracted financial and governance data related to the firms in our 
sample from the EDGARSCAN website. 
 
Table 3: Number Of Companies In Each Industry 
SIC 33 34 35 36 37 38 20 27 28 50 51 73 
Companies 20 23 27 25 23 22 23 21 23 22 20 22 
Notes: SIC denotes the Standard Industrial Classification: 33= Primary Metal Industries, 34= Fabricated Metal Products, except Machinery And 
Transportation Equipment, 35= Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment, 36= Electronic And Other Electrical 
Equipment And Components, Except Computer Equipment, 37= Transportation Equipment, 38= Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling 
Instruments; Photographic, Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks, 20= Food And Kindred Products, 27= Printing, Publishing, And 
Allied Industries, 28= Chemicals And Allied Products, 50=Wholesale Trade-durable Goods, 51= Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods, and 73= 
Business Services.  
                                                
2 NE : Net earning 
3 Current no discretionary earning 
4 Net current average profit of  the sample 
5 Future no discretionary earning 
6Net future average profit of  the sample 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample.   
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics Of Independents Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile 
Tenure 9.45 9.041 3 6 12 
Dual 0.795 0.402 1 1 1 
CEO.prop 0.061 0.116 0 0.01 0.06 
Board size 9.10 2.86 7 9 11 
Board.indep 6.423 3.292 4 7 9 
Firm size* 8153.702 39060.045 492.5 1460 812000 
Leverage 0.822 4.473 0.341 0.471 135.860 
*Firm size is in millions of dollar.  
 
Because the nature of the CEO’s departure from the firm is a critical component in the six hypotheses we 
proposed, we delineated types of departure for a more nuanced understanding of the phenomena under 
consideration. Specifically, we identified cases in which a CEO was retained, departed the firm voluntarily, or was 
forced to depart the firm. Of the 2710 observations in our sample, there were 186 cases in which the CEO left the 
company he worked for and 2524 cases in which the CEO was retained. The mean and median lengths of a CEO’s 
tenure according to the three types of departure we defined are provided in Table 5. 
  
Table 5: Distribution Of CEO Tenure Following The Three Types Of Departure 
Departure type  CEO Tenure 
Forced departure Mean Median 
3.81 
3.5 
Voluntary departure  Mean Median 
10.11 
8 
No departure Mean Median 
9.46 
6 
Total  Mean Median 
9.47 
6 
 
Table 5 reports the dispersion of CEO tenure following the two types of departure. The mean of length of a 
CEO’s tenure in which he/she voluntarily leaves a company is roughly 10 years. CEO’s who retain their positions 
have been at their companies for 9.5 years, on average. Moreover, among 186 cases of departure, 103 (55.3%) 
involved voluntary departure around retirement age (between 60 and 65). In 25 cases (13.4%), CEOs voluntarily left 
their respective companies after retirement age (older than 65 years), and 58 CEOs (31.2%) voluntarily left their 
positions before retirement age (younger than 60). Additionally, the average length of a CEO’s tenure prior to their 
departure is about ten years. This suggests that the CEOs of the firms in our sample enjoyed significant job security 
and largely left their positions voluntarily at retirement age or later (see Brickley, Coles, and Linck, 1998). Still, our 
sample demonstrates that there exist CEOs who voluntarily depart their respective firms before retirement age to 
pursue a different career path. 
 
For those cases in which the CEO did not depart the firm, the CEOs had been in their respective positions 
for about nine-and-a-half years, on average. Firms in our sample tended to retain their CEOs, as 93% of our sample 
is characterized by firms in which there was no CEO turnover. This suggests that the CEOs of the firms in our 
sample enjoyed substantial job security. Of the 2514 cases in which CEOs did not depart their firms, 555 were of 
retirement age and 231 exceeded retirement age, indicating that these CEOs may be effectively entrenched in their 
respective firms. 
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MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
 
 This section presents the results of the three regression models outlined in the previous section. 
 
Model 1 
 
 Table 6 reports the results of the first regression analysis, which tests the effect of CEO departure on firm 
performance. All independent variables are statistically significant predictors of firm performance, with the 
exception of the CEOs tenure, dual functions of the CEO and president of the board, and CEO propriety. Because 
these latter variables do not predict firm performance, we failed to find evidence for H3a, H3b, or H3c.  
 
Table 6: Model 1 
No.Disc.Earningit =α0 +α1Typ.depit +α2Tenureit +α3Dualit +α4CEO.propit +α5Board.sizeit +α6Board.indepit +α7Sizeit +α8Levit +εit   
Variables No.Disc.Earning Predicted Sign Coefficient T-Stat 
Typ.dep - -2.368 -8.145*** 
Tenure - 0,003 0,245 
Dual - -0,010 -0,048 
CEOprop - -0,625 -0,883 
Board.size + 0.175 4.028*** 
Board.indep + -0.075 -2.432** 
Size +/- -0.093 -1.682* 
Lev +/- 0.045 2.098** 
Adjusted R2  0.033 
F-statistic 0.0000 
Number of Obs. 2981 
***, **, * Indicates that the estimated coefficients are respectively significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, using a two-sided 
test (***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10) 
 
 Table 6 indicates that CEO departure negatively influences firm’s financial performance. Because most 
observations represent cases in which the CEO did not depart the company, CEO entrenchment seems to negatively 
affect firm financial performance. This result is consistent with those found by Furest (2000). As a result of leading 
their firms to positive financial outcomes, CEOs become more intrinsically attached to their posts and do not depart. 
This result supports the first hypothesis and the results of Evans, Nagarajan, and Schloetzer (2010).  
 
Moreover, our empirical results demonstrate that the size of boards of directors negatively influences firm 
performance (p < .01), thereby supporting H2a. Contrary to our predictions, however, board independence was 
shown to be negatively related to firm performance (p < .05). As such, we failed to find evidence to support H2b. 
This result was consistent with those produced by Bhagat and Black (1999) and Furest (2000), and suggests that 
independent directors can maintain informal relationships with CEOs, particularly if they own little of the company. 
Because our results suggest that independent members of the board may negatively affect firm performance, they 
likewise suggest that CEO entrenchment may be institutionalized if it guarantees positive financial gains.  
 
Model 2 
 
 In order to test the second model, we use current performance as a measure of the dependent variable. The 
cconsidered model and estimated results are reported in table 7 below. As in model 1, Table 7 shows that all 
independent variables are statistically significant with exception of the three variables “Tenure”, “Dual” , and 
“CEO.prop” which do not support hypothesis (H3a), (H3b) and (H3c). 
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Table 7: Model 2 
Current.Perfit =α0 +α1Typ.depit +α2Tenureit +α3Dualit +α4CEO.propit +α5Board.sizeit +α6Board.indepit +α7Sizeit +α8Levit +εit  
Variables Current.Perf Predicted Sign Coefficient T-Stat 
Typ.dep - -2.3770 -8.249*** 
Tenure - 0,0021 0,202 
Dual - -0,0025 -0,012 
CEO.prop  - -0.9342 -1.332 
Board.size + 0.1581 3.684*** 
Board.indep + -0.0710 -2.305** 
Size +/- -0.0823 -1.495 
Lev +/- 0.0452 2.131** 
Adjusted R2  0.034 
F-statistic 0.0000 
Number of Obs. 2981 
***, **, * Indicates that the estimated coefficients are respectively significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, using a two-sided 
test. 
 
As in Model 1, results indicate that CEO departure is a significant negative predictor of current firm 
performance. This suggests that when a firm’s current financial performance is good, CEOs tend to retain their 
positions until entrenchment, further suggesting that CEO entrenchment has a negative impact on firm performance. 
This confirms H1. 
 
Also consistent with Model 1, Model 2 shows the size of the board of directors to be positively related to 
current financial performance (p < .01). This suggests that board size positively affects a CEO’s retention, which in 
turn, negatively affects current financial performance. These results provide support for H2a. In contrast, board 
independence is significantly and negatively associated with current firm performance (p < .05). This result implies 
that board independence negatively influences the impact of a CEO’s retention on firm’s current financial 
performance. This result fails to provide evidence to support H2b. 
 
Our results also indicate that the proportion of the firm owned by the CEO is negatively associated with the 
firm’s current performance. Although our findings suggest that CEO entrenchment negatively affects a firm’s 
current financial performance (see Evans, Nagarajan, and Schloetzer, 2010), there was no evidence to support H3b. 
Similarly, the coefficient associated with firm size was negative but not statistically significant. Finally, the results 
summarized in Table 7 demonstrate that when a firm enjoys good current financial performance, its level of debt 
increases. 
 
Model 3 
 
 Results of the regression analysis associated with Model 3 are reported Table 8. These results demonstrate 
that the dual nature of CEO and board president functions, the length of a CEO’s tenure, the proportion of the firm 
owned by the CEO, and firm size are not significantly related to future firm performance. Therefore, similar to 
Models 1 and 2, there is no evidence to support H3a, H3b, or H3c with regard to future firm performance.  
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Table 8: Estimation Model 3 
Future.Perfit =α0 +α1Typ.depit +α2Tenureit +α3Dualit +α4CEOpropit +α5Board.sizeit +α6Board.indepit +α7Sizeit +α8Levit +εit  
Variables Future. Perf Predicted Sign Coefficient T-Stat 
Typ.dep - -2.4099 -8.546*** 
Tenure - -0 .0026 -0,261 
Dual - -0,0043 -0,020 
CEO.prop - -0,6854 -0,999 
Board.size + 0.1409 3.353*** 
Board.indep + -0.0673 -2.231** 
Size +/- -0,0620 -1,149 
Lev +/- 0.0367 1.771* 
Adjusted R2  0.0342 
F-statistic 0.0000 
Number of Obs. 2981 
***, **, * Indicates that the estimated coefficients are respectively significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, using a two-sided test. 
 
As in Models 1 and 2, results of Model 3 show CEO departure type to be a significant and negative 
predictor of future firm performance. This suggests that when the financial performance of the firm is expected to be 
good, CEOs tend not to leave their posts. This finding supports H1. Also consistent with Models 1 and 2, the size of 
the board of directors is positively related to a firm’s future financial performance (p < .01). Based on this finding, 
we conclude that board size positively influences the relationship between a CEO’s retention and the future financial 
performance of his/her firm. This result provides support for H2a. In contrast, the independence of the board of 
directors is negatively and significantly related to future firm performance (p < .05), thereby reinforcing that board 
independence negatively affects the influence of a CEO’s retention on future firm performance. This finding 
similarly contradicts H2b. Moreover, Table 8 shows also that debt level is moderately and positively related to 
future firm performance (p < .10), which denote that when future financial performance is good, the level of debt 
increases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
Our results of the current study suggest that the CEO retention negatively affects the current and future 
performance of the firm. For the majority of the observations in our sample, we found CEO tenure length to be 
between nine and ten years, suggesting that CEOs tended not to leave their firms. Thus, we conclude that the CEOs 
of the firms in our sample are entrenched. Furthermore, we found that board size positively affects the relationship 
CEO departure type and firm performance. This finding suggests that when the board of directors grows in size, its 
control becomes less efficient. In contrast, we found the proportion of outsiders on a board of directors to be 
negatively associated with this relationship.  
 
Similar to the results summarized above, we also found board size to positively affect a company’s current 
and future financial performance. In contrast, board independence was shown to negatively influence current and 
future firm performance. Empirical results also support the notion that CEO entrenchment has a negative effect on 
firm performance and that board member independence is most effective when it is operational and informal. 
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